We study values for transferable utility games enriched by a communication graph. The most well-known such values are component-efficient and characterized by some link-deletion property. We study efficient extensions of such values: for a given component-efficient value, we look for a value that (i) satisfies efficiency, (ii) satisfies the link-deletion property underlying the original component-efficient value, and (iii) coincides with the original component-efficient value whenever the underlying graph is connected. Béal et al. (2015) prove that the Myerson value (Myerson, 1977) admits a unique efficient extension, which has been introduced by van den Brink et al. (2012) . We pursue this line of research by showing that the average tree solution (Herings et al., 2008) and the compensation solution (Béal et al., 2012a) admit similar unique efficient extensions, and that there exists no efficient extension of the position Value (Meessen, 1988; Borm et al., 1992) . As byproducts, we obtain new characterizations of the average tree solution and the compensation solution, and of their efficient extensions.
Introduction
Cooperative games with transferable utility (henceforth TU-games) describe the worth that each coalition of players can generate by cooperating. The objective is to find a value, which rewards the players for participating in the TU-game with a certain payoff. In this classical model, such a value can only depend (possibly) on the worths of the coalitions of players. The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953 ) is the most well-known value for TU-games. However, in many situations the exogenous affinities among players are represented by some social, hierarchical, economical, communicational, or technical structure. Two prominent examples are the games with a coalition structure introduced by Aumann and Dreze (1974) and Owen (1977) and the games with a communication structure (called CO-games hereafter) proposed by Myerson (1977) . In the first model, the players are organized in a priori unions. In the second model, the communication among the players are is modeled by the links of an undirected graph. In both models, it is crucial to evaluate the influence of the exogenous structure on the payoff allocation, and in each of the above-mentioned articles, the Shapley value is generalized in a specific way. For games with a coalition structure, two interpretations coexist since the beginning. On the one hand, Aumann and Dreze (1974) propose a value that is component-efficient: the players only share the worth of their own a priori union. On the other hand, Owen (1977) introduces an efficient value, which is motivated by Hart and Kurz (1983, p.1048) as follows: "(...) outcomes are "overall efficient", no matter the players are organized. Thus, we assume as a postulate that society as a whole operates efficiently; the problem we address here is how are the benefits distributed among the participants. With this view in mind, coalitions do not form in order to obtain their "worth" and then "leave" the game. But rather, they "stay" in the game and bargain as a unit with all the other players."
The Myerson value (Myerson, 1977) can be considered as the counterpart for CO-games of the value suggested by Aumann and Dreze (1974) for games with a coalition structure. It is componentefficient: the players only share the worth of their own component of the graph. This property is also satisfied by numerous values for CO-games (henceforth CO-values) that appeared consequently in the literature such as the position value (Meessen, 1988; Borm et al., 1992) , the average tree solution (Herings et al., 2008) and the compensation solution (Béal et al., 2012a ). All such CO-values are characterized by component efficiency and an appealing link deletion property which reflects the payoff variation of some players when some links are removed from the graph. Surprisingly, for CO-games, counterparts of the value proposed by Owen (1977) have been less popular so far and only appeared recently (see Casajus, 2007; Hamiache, 2012; Béal et al., 2012b; van den Brink et al., 2012) .
In this article, we introduce new efficient CO-values that are efficient extensions of well-known component-efficient CO-values. More specifically, for a given component-efficient CO-value, an efficient extension is any CO-value which (i) is efficient, (ii) satisfies the link deletion property characterizing the original component-efficient CO-value, and (iii) coincides with the original componentefficient CO-value whenever the underlying graph is connected. This approach has been initiated by Béal et al. (2015) , in which it is shown that the Myerson value admits a unique efficient extension: the CO-value studied by van den Brink et al. (2012) . We show that the average tree solution and the Compensation admit unique efficient extensions (Theorems 4 and 6, respectively). Moreover, these efficient extensions can be constructed similarly to the efficient extension of the Myerson value: each player receives his payoff according to the corresponding component-efficient CO-value plus an equal share of the surplus of worth generated by the grand coalition compared to the total worth achieved by the components of the graph.
These results seem to suggest that an efficient extension always exists, is unique, and is always built by means of the previous construction. We show that these assertions are not all valid. Firstly, we prove that there does not exist any efficient extension of the position value (Theorem 8). Secondly, we conclude the article by showing that the component-wise egalitarian solution characterized by Slikker (2007) admits a unique efficient extension, but that it is not constructed by evenly splitting surplus produced by the grand coalition compared to the total worth achieved by the components of the graph in addition to the component-wise egalitarian solution.
Our (possibility) results are obtained by means of new axiomatic characterizations of the average tree solution and the compensation solution on the domain of connected cycle-free graphs (Propositions 1 and 2, respectively). These characterizations are also adapted to provide axiomatic characterizations of their efficient extensions (parts (ii) in Theorems 4 and 6).
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 contains preliminaries, the definition of an efficient extension, and exposes a result from Béal et al. (2015) . Sections 3 and 4 provide all the material on the average tree solution and the compensation solution, respectively. Section 5 proves the impossibility result about the position value. Section 6 concludes by a discussion on the unique efficient extension of the component-wise egalitarian solution.
Cooperative games and graphs
Fix an infinite set U, the universe of players, and let N denote the set of non-empty and finite subsets of U.
Cooperative games with transferable utilities
A TU-game is a pair pN, vq consisting of a set of players N P N and a coalition function v P tf : 2 N ÝÑ R | f pHq " 0u, where 2 N denotes the power set of N . Subsets of N are called coalitions, and vpSq is called the worth of coalition S. For any TU-game pN, vq and any S Ď N , the sub-game of pN, vq induced by S is denoted by pS, v| S q, where v| S is the restriction of v to 2 S . A TU-game pN, vq is zero-normalized if vptiuq " 0 for all i P N .
A value on N is an operator ϕ that assigns a payoff vector ϕpN, vq P R N to any TU-game pN, vq. The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953 ) is the value given by
for all TU-games pN, vq and i P N .
Graphs
of L is written as ij :" ti, ju. Player's i, j P N are called connected in pN, Lq if there is a sequence of players pi 1 , i 2 , . . . , i k q, k P N, k ą 1 from N such that i 1 " i, i k " j, and i i `1 P L for all P t1, . . . , k´1u . It is clear that connectedness is an equivalence relation. Hence, it induces a partition C pN, Lq of N , the set of components of pN, Lq , such that C P C pN, Lq, i, j P C, k P N zC, i ‰ j implies that i and j are connected and that i and k are not connected in pN, Lq . The component of pN, Lq containing i P N is denoted by
A graph pN, Lq is cycle-free if each ij P L is a bridge, and each of its components is called a tree.
A directed graph for N P N is pair pN, Dq , D Ď D N :" pNˆN qz tpi, iq | i P N u ; pi, jq P D N is called a directed link from i to j. For any cycle-free graph pN, Lq and any C P CpN, Lq, each player r P C induces a rooted spanning tree on C, i.e., a directed graph that arises from the tree pC, L| C q by directing all links away from the root r. If a spanning tree rooted at r contains a directed link pi, jq, then j is a called a successor of i. Denote by s r piq the possibly empty set of successors of player i P C in the spanning tree rooted at r. A player j is a subordinate of i if there is a directed path from i to j, i.e., if there is a sequence of distinct players pi 1 , . . . , i k q, k P N, k ą 1 from N such that i 1 " i, i k " j, and, for each " t1, . . . , k´1u, i `1 P s r pi q. The set S r piq denotes the union of all subordinates of i in the spanning tree rooted at r and i.
Communication games
A CO-game is a triple pN, v, Lq, where pN, vq is a TU-game and L Ď L N . We denote by G the set of all such CO-games. A CO-game is called connected if the associated graph is connected, and cycle-free is the associated graph is cycle-free. We denote by G C Ď G, G CF Ď G and G 0 Ă G the classes of all connected CO-games, of all cycle-free CO-games, and of all zero-normalized CO-games respectively. A CO-value on some class of CO-games G˚Ď G is an operator ϕ that assigns a payoff vector ϕpN, v, Lq P R N to every CO-game pN, v, Lq P G˚.
The Myerson value (Myerson, 1977) is the CO-value on G given by
It is characterized by component efficiency and fairness. Throughout this article, we sometimes invoke axioms on different subclasses of CO-games indicated by "| G˚" in their definition. For any such subclass, all the CO-games used in the axiom belong to the subclass. If an axiom is invoked on a unique class of CO-games or if G˚" G, we omit this indicator.
Fairness, F. For all pN, v, Lq P G, and ij P L,
Component efficiency states that the worth of each component of the graph is distributed among its members. Fairness requires that removing a link from the graph changes the payoffs of the players forming this link by the same amount. Theorem 1. (Myerson, 1977 ) The Myerson value is the unique CO-value on G that satisfies component efficiency (CE) and fairness (F).
Efficient extensions
The axiom of component efficiency is natural if the communication among the players in the communication graph is interpreted as a necessity to generate worth. Another plausible interpretation is that the generation of worth is not constrained by the communication graph, which is simply used to evaluate the a priori affinities among the players in order to provide a payoff allocation. Under this alternative interpretation, the axiom of efficiency below is natural.
Let ψ be any CO-value characterized on some class of CO-games G˚by component efficiency and some link deletion property denoted by LDP ψ . The efficient extension of ψ is a CO-value ϕ on G˚such that
Point (i) means that ϕ is efficient while ψ is component efficient. Point (ii) means that ϕ and ψ both satisfy the link deletion property which is characteristic of ψ. Point (iii) means that ϕ and ψ prescribe the same payoff vector in all CO-games in G˚where the graph is connected, i.e., where efficiency and component efficiency are the same condition. All in all, this means that ϕ is very close to ψ, somehow the CO-value closest to ψ among the efficient CO-values as will be explained later.
The first efficient extension has been proposed by van den Brink et al. (2012) for the Myerson value. We call it the efficient egalitarian Myerson value EEMY, given by
for all CO-games pN, v, Lq P G, and i P N . Béal et al. (2015) show that EEMY is the unique efficient extension of the Myerson value.
Theorem 2. (Béal et al., 2015) The efficient egalitarian Myerson value EEMY is the unique efficient extension of the Myerson value, i.e., ϕ satisfies ϕ " MY on G C and meets efficiency (E) and fairness (F), if and only if ϕ " EEMY on G.
In the next three sections, we study the efficient extensions of three other CO-values: the average tree solution, the compensation solution, and the position value.
The average tree solution: characterizations and a unique efficient extension
For all pN, v, Lq P G CF , all C P CpN, Lq, and r P C, Demange (2004) defines the hierarchical outcome for the spanning tree on C rooted at r as:
for each i P C. The average tree solution AT introduced by Herings et al. (2008) is the CO-value on G CF that assigns to each cycle-free CO-game and to each player the average of his hierarchical outcomes:
for all pN, v, Lq P G CF , and i P N . They use component efficiency and component fairness below in order to characterize the average tree solution for cycle-free CO-games.
Component fairness, CF. For all pN, v, Lq P G CF , and ij P L,
Component fairness states that deleting a link between two players yields for both resulting new components the same per-capita change in payoffs.
Theorem 3. (Herings et al., 2008) The average tree solution is the unique CO-value on G CF that satisfies component efficiency (CE| G CF ) and component fairness (CF).
In this section, we show that the average tree solution admits a unique efficient extension. This result will be the consequence of other results, which are analogous of those in Béal et al. (2015) for the Myerson value. In order to understand the average tree solution as an efficient CO-value for connected and cycle-free CO-games, we begin by invoking the following property.
Similarly to component fairness, connected component fairness considers the average change of the payoffs of the components of two players i and j if the link ij is removed. Connected component fairness compares the original payoffs with the payoffs obtained if the CO-game is restricted to each player's component, respectively, and imposes an equal average payoff variation. Note that all graphs involved in this axiom are connected and cycle-free. We suggest the following characterization of the average tree solution on the class of connected and cycle-free CO-games.
Proposition 1. A CO-value ϕ on G CF X G C satisfies efficiency (E| G CF XG C ) and connected component fairness (CCF) if and only if ϕ " AT on G CF X G C .
Proof. By construction, AT satisfies E| G CF XG C . Concerning CCF, recall first that for a CO-game pN, v, Lq P G CF , a component C P CpN, Lq, and a player i P C, the payoff assigned by AT to player i only relies on the worths of some coalitions in 2 C by the definition of all hierarchical outcomes. This means that AT satisfies the axiom of component decomposability 1 (van den Nouweland, 1993, pp. 28-29) . As a consequence, for any link ij P L, it holds that both
for all k P C j pN, Lztijuq. Using these equalities and the fact that AT satisfies CF, we obtain
for all pN, v, Lq P G CF and ij P L. Since this condition holds for all pN, v, Lq P G CF , it obviously holds for all pN, v, Lq P G CF X G C , which means that AT satisfies CCF. It remains to show that if a CO-value ϕ on G CF XG C satisfies the two axioms, then it is uniquely determined. This part of the proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.4 of Herings et al. (2008) . Thus, we only sketch the proof by induction on the cardinality of the player set. For a CO-game pN, v, Lq P G CF X G C such that |N | " 1, E| G CF XG C uniquely determines ϕ. Now, suppose that ϕ is uniquely determined for all pN, v, Lq P G CF X G C such that |N | ă n and consider a CO-game pN, v, Lq P G CF XG C such that |N | " n. Applying CCF, E| G CF XG C , and the induction hypothesis as in proof of Theorem 3.4 of Herings et al. (2008) , we get a system of linearly independent equations as desired.I n the next Theorem, we prove that there exists a unique efficient extension of the average tree solution for cycle-free CO-games. In other words, there exists a unique CO-value that satisfies efficiency and component fairness and that coincides with the average tree solution for connected cycle-free CO-games. We call this value the efficient egalitarian average tree solution EEAT that is defined by
for all pN, v, Lq P G CF , and i P N . Moreover, we give a concise characterization of the efficient egalitarian average tree solution. The proof of Theorem 4 is based on the following lemma, which states that if two CO-values for cycle-free CO-games satisfy efficiency, component fairness, and agree on connected cycle-free COgames, then they must assign the same total payoff to all components of a graph in all cycle-free CO-games. Lemma 1. Let ϕ and ψ be two CO-values on G CF that satisfy efficiency (E| G CF ) and component fairness (CF). If ϕ " ψ on G CF X G C , then ř iPC ϕ i pN, v, Lq " ř iPC ψ i pN, v, Lq for all pN, v, Lq P G CF and all C P CpN, Lq.
Proof. Let ϕ and ψ be two CO-values for cycle-free CO-games that satisfy E| G CF and CF and suppose that ϕpN, v, Lq " ψpN, v, Lq for all pN, v, Lq P G CF X G C . The result follows by E| G CF on connected cycle-free CO-games. So, consider any cycle-free CO-game pN, v, Lq P G CF zG C , which implies |CpN, Lq| ą 1. Suppose that there is a cycle-free CO-game in which ϕ and ψ do not assign the same total payoff to some component. More specifically, consider pN, v, Lq P G CF zG C with a maximal L Ď L N such that ř iPC ϕ i pN, v, Lq ‰ ř iPC ψ i pN, v, Lq for some C P CpN, Lq. Since |CpN, Lq| ą 1, we can consider distinct players i, j P N such that i P C and j P N zC. By CF, the maximality of L, and the initial assumption, we get
Equivalently, the latter equality can be written as
Summing the last expression on all C j pN, Lq in CpN, Lq and using E| G CF yields
a contradiction that proves the result.W e are now ready to prove Theorem 4.
Proof. (Theorem 4) (i) EEAT satisfies E| G CF and coincides with AT on connected cycle-free CO-games by construction, as well as inherits CF from AT. For the uniqueness part, consider any CO-value ϕ on G CF that satisfies the two axioms and that coincides with AT for connected cyclefree CO-games. By definition of EEAT, for any pN, v, Lq P G CF X G C , it holds that ϕpN, v, Lq " ATpN, v, Lq " EEATpN, v, Lq. Therefore, Lemma 1 implies that for all pN, v, Lq P G CF and all C P CpN, Lq, we have
In particular, if L " H, then CpN, Lq " ttiu, i P N u and thus ϕpN, v, Lq " EEATpN, v, Lq. This proves that ϕ is uniquely determined for all cycle-free CO-games with an empty graph. It remains to consider cycle-free CO-games with a non-empty graph. So pick any pN, v, Lq P G CF , L ‰ H, and any ij P L. By CF, it holds that ÿ
Since tC i pN, Lztijuq, C j pN, Lztijuqu Ď CpN, Lztijuq, Lemma 1 implies that both ÿ
and ÿ
Therefore, (1) becomes:
It is useful to express this equality as:
There are |L| " |N |´|CpN, Lq| equations of type (2). Furthermore, for each C P CpN, Lq, we also know from Lemma 1 that ÿ
There are |CpN, Lq| equations of type (3). All in all, we obtain a system of |N | equations. The left-hand sides of this system and of the system with a unique solution obtained by Herings et al. (2008, proof of Theorem 3.4) are identical. Since only the right-hand side is different in our system, it also has a unique solution.
(ii) One easily checks that EEAT obeys CCF. Uniqueness follows from Lemma 1, Theorem 4 (i), and Proposition 1.R emark 1. The characterization of the efficient egalitarian average tree solution in Theorem 4 (ii) is non-redundant. The Null value assigning a null payoff to all players in all CO-games satisfies component fairness and connected component fairness but not efficiency. The egalitarian value EV defined as
for all pN, v, Lq P G and i P N satisfies efficiency and component fairness but not connected component fairness. The CO-value ϕ given by
for all pN, v, Lq P G and i P N satisfies efficiency and connected component fairness but not component fairness.
The compensation solution: characterizations and a unique efficient extension
The compensation solution has been introduced in Béal et al. (2012a) for cycle-free CO-games. It is build from the compensation vectors defined as follows. For each CO-game pN, v, Lq P G CF , each component C P CpN, Lq, and each spanning tree rooted at r on C, define the compensation vector as 
for all i P N . Firstly, the contribution of player i P C consists in sharing equally the worth vpCq with the other members of component C. Then, for each coalition S r j , j P Cztru, formed according to the partial order of the spanning tree rooted at r, player i receives a share vpS r j q{|S r j | if he belongs to this coalition or pays vpS r j q{|CzS r j | otherwise. On G CF , the compensation solution CS is defined as the average over all rooted spanning trees of the contribution vector (4). Formally,
for all pN, v, Lq P G CF and i P N . Béal et al. (2012a) characterize the compensation solution by component efficiency and relative fairness. Relative fairness, RF. For all pN, v, Lq P G CF , and ij P L,
Relative fairness can be interpreted in the context of the merging of components C i pN, Lztijuq and C j pN, Lztijuq through a new link ij. The axiom says that the payoff variation of players i and j with respect to the per-capita payoff in their pre-existing components C i pN, Lztijuq and C i pN, Lztijuq should be the same.
Theorem 5. (Béal et al., 2012a) The compensation solution CS is the unique CO-value that satisfies component efficiency (CE| G CF ) and relative fairness (RF).
The method developed in Béal et al. (2015) for the Myerson value and in the previous section for the average tree solution also works to construct the unique efficient extension of the compensation solution and to provide new characterizations of the compensation solution. Since the proof of the results in this section exploits similar arguments, we omit them and make them available upon request. We start by a characterization of the compensation solution on connected cycle-free CO-games by relying on the following axiom. Connected relative fairness, CRF. For all pN, v, Lq P G CF X G C and ij P L,
Connected relative fairness is similar to relative fairness except that after deleting link ij, the CO-game is restricted to each player's component, respectively. Thus, all graphs involved in this axiom are connected and cycle-free.
Proposition 2. A CO-value ϕ on G CF X G C satisfies efficiency (E| G CF XG C ) and connected relative fairness (CRF) if and only if ϕ " CS on G CF X G C .
Next, we show that the compensation solution admits a unique efficient extension, which we call the efficient egalitarian compensation solution. As for the Myerson value and the average tree solution, this CO-value is obtained by adding an equal share of the surplus created between the components,`v pN q´v L pN q˘{ |N |, to the compensation solution. More specifically, the efficient egalitarian compensation solution EECS is defined by
for all pN, v, Lq P G CF and i P N . The next theorem also provides a characterization of the efficient egalitarian compensation solution. 2 Theorem 6. (i) A CO-value ϕ on G CF satisfies efficiency (E| G CF ), relative fairness (RF), and ϕ " CS on G CF X G C if and only if ϕ " EECS on G CF .
(ii) A CO-value ϕ on G CF satisfies efficiency (E| G CF ), relative fairness (RF), and connected relative fairness (CRF) if and only if ϕ " EECS.
Remark 2. The characterization of the efficient egalitarian compensation solution in Theorem 6 (ii) is non-redundant. The null value assigning a null payoff to all player in all CO-games satisfies relative fairness and connected relative fairness but not efficiency. The egalitarian value EV defined in Remark 1 satisfies efficiency and relative fairness but not connected relative fairness. The CO-value ϕ¯given by ϕī pN, v, Lq " CS i pvq`v pN q´v L pN q |CpN, Lq|¨|C i pN, Lq| for all pN, v, Lq P G and i P N satisfies efficiency and connected component fairness but not relative fairness.
Remark 3. Among all the efficient CO-values, the efficient extensions of the average tree solution and of the compensation solution uniquely minimize the euclidean distance to the average tree solution and the compensation solution, respectively. More specifically, it is straightforward to show that EEATpN, v, Lq " argmin
for all pN, v, Lq P G, where d px, yq :" a ř iPN px i´yi q 2 denotes the Euclidean distance between x P R N and y P R N . This property provides a supplementary evidence that these two efficient extensions can be considered as very close to their original component-efficient CO-values.
The position value: an impossibility result
The position value is introduced by Meessen (1988) and Borm et al. (1992) . For any pN, v, Lq P G 0 , the associated link game is the TU-game pL, r v q such that
This link game is a TU-game in which the players can be identified with the links in the original CO-game. The worth of a coalition of players A in the link game is the total worth generated by the components of graph pN, Aq. The link game is well-defined: r v pHq " 0 because pN, vq is zero-normalized. The position value is the CO-value PV that assigns to each player half of the Shapley value of each of its links in the link game, that is, Balanced total threats says that the total threat of any player towards another player equals to the total threat of that player towards the first player, where the total threat of a player towards another player is the sum over all links of the first player of payoff differences the second player experiences if such a link is broken.
Theorem 7. (Slikker, 2005) The position value PV is the unique CO-value that satisfies component efficiency (CE| G 0 ) and balanced total threats (BTT).
It is easy to check that the CO-value defined by assigning every player pvpN q´v L pN qq{|N | plus his/her payoff according to the position value satisfies efficiency and coincides with the position value whenever the underlying graph is connected. However, it does not satisfy balanced total threats. This means that the method used to construct the unique efficient extension of the Myerson value, the average tree solution and the compensation Solution does not yield the efficient extension of the position Value. Below, a stronger result is demonstrated: there does not exist any efficient extension of the position Value.
Theorem 8. There does not exists any efficient extension of the position value, i.e., no value ϕ on G 0 satisfies ϕ " PV on G 0 X GC and meets efficiency (E| G 0 ) and balanced total threats (BTT).
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. So assume that there is a CO-value ϕ on G 0 that satisfies ϕ " PV on G 0 X G C , E| G 0 , and BTT. Consider any player set N such that |N | ě 4, and without any loss of generality, assume that t1, 2, 3u Ă N . Pick player 1 P N in order to show that ϕ is not well-defined in the CO-game pN, v, Lq where L " L N zt1u . In graph pN, Lq, player 1 has no link and the subgraph pN zt1u, LpN zt1uqq induced by pN, Lq on N zt1u is complete. First, note that any graph pN, L 1 q such that |L 1 | " |L|`1 and L 1 Ą L is connected, i.e., adding any missing link to the unconnected graph pN, Lq yields a connected graph. Of course, any such added link is of the form 1i for some i P N zt1u.
Next, we consider the CO-game pN, v, L Y 12q in order to compute ϕpN, v, Lq. According to the previous remark, pN, L Y 12q is a connected graph, or equivalently, pN, v, L Y 12q P G 0 X G C . Another important property is that, for all links ij P L, the graph pN, pL Y 12qzijq remains connected since |N zt1u| ě 3 and pN zt1u, LpN zt1uqq is a complete graph (in other words, no link in pN zt1u, LpN zt1uqq is a bridge). Therefore, pN, v, pL Y 12qzijq P G 0 X G C as well. Now, let us apply BTT to all pairs of players t1, iu, i P N zt1u. Two cases are possible. For i " 2, we get ÿ jPN zt2u
Since ϕ " PV on G 0 X G C , the previous expression can be rewritten as:
or equivalently,
Observe that the right-hand side of this expression is uniquely determined, and more importantly, that it has been obtained by invoking BTT and the fact that ϕ " PV on G 0 X G C only. This means that this equality holds for every CO-value satisfying BTT and that coincides with PV on G 0 X G C . Since the position value is obviously one such CO-value, it must be that
Similarly, for all i P N zt1, 2u, the application of BTT to the pair of players t1, iu yields ÿ jPN ztiu
Using once again the fact that ϕ " PV on G 0 X G C , we can rewrite the previous expression as
For the same reason as above (i.e., the case where i " 2), this equality is also true for the position value, so that we can write ϕ i pN, v, Lq " PV i pN, v, Lq
for all i P N zt1, 2u. Furthermore, since ϕ satisfies E| G 0 , it holds that ř iPN ϕ i pN, v, Lq " vpN q, and by using both (7) and the fact that PV is component-efficient in the CO-game pN, v, Lq, the previous efficiency condition is equivalent to ϕ 1 pN, v, Lq`ϕ 2 pN, v, Lq " vpN q´v L pN q`PV 1 pN, v, Lq`PV 2 pN, v, Lq.
It is easy to see that the unique solution of the system of two equations formed by (6) and (8) for all i P t1, 2u. For the final step of the proof, repeat the above procedure in the CO-game pN, v, L Y 13q instead of the CO-game pN, v, L Y 12q, and obtain ϕ i pN, v, Lq " PV i pN, v, Lq for all i P N zt1, 3u and ϕ i pN, v, Lq " PV i pN, v, Lq`pvpN q´v L pN qq{2 for each i P t1, 3u. Provided that vpN q ‰ v L pN q, note that ϕ 2 pN, v, Lq has two different values according to whether the original CO-game to which BTT is applied is pN, v, L Y 12q or pN, v, L Y 13q, a contradiction. This completes the proof.6
.
Concluding remarks
This article has extended the approach initiated by Béal et al. (2015) on the efficient extension of communication values. Combined with the results in Béal et al. (2015) , our findings suggest that whenever an efficient extension of a component-efficient CO-value exists, it is unique and assigns to each player an equal share of the surplus created by the grand coalition in addition to its payoff according to the component-efficient CO-value. This is not always the case. To see this, consider the component-wise egalitarian solution CW defined on G as This axiom states that the payoff variation experienced by a first player when all links in the component of a second player are severed is identical to payoff variation of the second player when all links in the component of the first player are deleted. Now, consider the egalitarian value EV defined in Remark 1. This CO-value is an efficient extension of the component-wise egalitarian solution. Indeed, it trivially coincides with CW for connected CO-games, satisfies efficiency and balanced component contributions. The latter property drops from the fact that EV is not sensitive to L. Nonetheless, EV is not obtained by adding to CW an equal share of the surplus vpN q´v L pN q. Furthermore, it is not difficult to show that there is no other efficient extension of the componentwise egalitarian solution. As a consequence, if an efficient extension exists, the question of whether it is always unique remains open.
